BACKGROUND
'Participation' has long been a central tenet of primary health care. 1 Participation can vary from token representation to group membership to full-equal partnership in controlling community organisations, and is regarded as one of the key principles of health promotion. 2, 3 Having a sense of community and community involvement are said to have positive effects on health but research supporting such associations is inconclusive. [4] [5] [6] [7] Involvement in community organisations and activities is one form of participation that has received attention in the United States (US) and more recently in Australia as an element of social capital. 8, 9 Community psychology research in the US supports the idea that participation in neighborhood action groups contributes to an increased sense of community and
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND SELF-RATED HEALTH STATUS: FINDINGS FROM A CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY IN CENTRAL SYDNEY
Prevalence estimates of study variables were weighted for the probability of selection based on the household size and number of telephone lines, and also for age and sex structure of the resident population of CSAHS based on the 1996 Census data. 14 In recording study variables of level of sense of community and level of community involvement, respondents who reported 'a great deal', 'quite a lot' or 'moderately' to the sense of community question were recoded as 'having some sense of community'. The rest were recoded as 'having little sense of community'. Similarly, the respondents were categorised as either 'having been involved in the community', including 'moderately' or 'very', or 'having not been involved in the community'. The study outcome variable of health status was recoded as either 'poor to fair' or 'good to excellent'. Unconditional logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine the factors that might be associated with self-reported health at multivariate levels with all variables entered in a single step without checking any of the entry criteria except tolerance. Data were analysed using SPSS for Windows 10.0, a computer program for the social sciences.
RESULTS
The response rate to the 1998 NSW Health Survey was 66.3 per cent in residents of the CSAHS.
14 Of 880 study subjects, 46 per cent were males and 54 per cent were females, with mean ages of 42 and 44 respectively. Forty two per cent were either married or living with a partner. A little more than half of respondents (51 per cent) were working full time and three quarters (75 per cent) had finished secondary and tertiary education. Most (72 per cent) reported speaking English at home. Approximately half of the respondents reported having some sense of community (50 per cent), or having been involved in the community (46 per cent) (see Table 2 ). Spearman's rho correlation coefficient between sense of community and being involved in the community was low (0.304). Additional findings include: 22 per cent of respondents reported drinking alcohol at hazardous and harmful levels, 29 per cent were smokers, 36 per cent were overweight and 33 per cent were physically inactive. In addition, people who were smokers (adjusted odds ratio of 2.20, with 95 per cent CI 1.46-3.33), overweight (adjusted odds ratio of 1.57 with 95 per cent CI 1.07-2.32) or physically inactive (adjusted odds ratio of 1.67 with 95 per cent CI 1.14-2.45) are significantly more likely to report poorer health.
DISCUSSION
This analysis found no evidence supporting an association between community involvement and self-reported health. The factors associated with self-reported health are age, employment status, language spoken at home, smoking status, weight status, and level of physical activity. People who are aged 41 to 50 years or over 60 years, work part time, speak a language other than English at home, smoke, are overweight, or are physically inactive are significantly more likely to report their health status as 'poor' or 'fair'.
The results are consistent with Veenstra's study, 7 which concluded that civic participation was unrelated to selfreported health. Both studies focused on individual attributes. Most social capital studies that have reported associations with health have, however, examined the association between community involvement and community level indicators of health status such as all cause or disease-specific mortality rate. 4 It may be that associations between community involvement or social capital and health are detectable when communities rather than individuals are the unit of analysis.
In the Australian context it may be that general 'participation' in civic life does not affect health. The culture of volunteering and nature of participation in the United States differs markedly from that in Australia. 18 Therefore, it may be important to specify what sort of participation leads to better health and to consider whether our current approaches to measurement of participation are adequate. The issue of international comparisons also raises the question of whether social capital is a cross-cultural construct, although Putnam would argue that it is. 8 The results are limited by the cross-sectional study design that limits the findings of any causal relationship. It was not possible to obtain information about other variables that might play important roles in community participation or health, such as social support and trust. Also, individuals and groups may need to collaborate on shared activities before any benefits of this involvement manifest as health improvements.
Without any group level data available, the analysis could not adjust for any possible contextual effects. Given that the type of community is likely to modify community involvement (for example, affecting the number of organisations in the community), it is highly likely that any conclusions based on this analysis are committing a psychologistic fallacy (that is, assuming that individuallevel outcomes can be explained exclusively in terms of individual-level characteristics). 19 This highlights the importance of health surveys collecting group-level data as well as individual data, so that appropriate multi-level analyses can be done.
CONCLUSION
We found no evidence of a relationship between community involvement and self-rated health status. We recommend that future efforts to study this association use communities or groups as the unit of analysis and that more effort goes into developing adequate indicators of participation and sense of community. It may be that the sorts of indicators being examined at the individual level are appropriate: for instance, membership in community, political, social and hobby organisations; number of organisations belonged to; level of responsibility or activity as a member; and length of membership. 12 However, aggregating these data at a meaningful social level-perhaps local government area, town, or regionmay better reflect how social participation affects sense of community and health. 
BACKGROUND
Anxiety became a background element in the lives of many people, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September, 2001 . Perceptions that our lives were not as safe as had been assumed were widely discussed.
In early October 2001, the media reported that a 63 yearold man in Florida, who worked for a newspaper publisher, had died from anthrax. The discovery of B. anthracis spores at the man's workplace, and in an envelope on his desk, led to a fear of 'suspicious white powders' and the prospect of renewed terrorist activity. 1 Large numbers of reports of suspected B. anthracis spores were subsequently received by police around the world. Some related to malicious hoaxes, while others represented the fear of individuals faced with an improbable but unpredictable threat.
Anthrax is a disease caused by infection with the bacterium B. anthracis. The bacteria can lead to three forms of anthrax: cutaneous, pulmonary, and intestinal. Anthrax occurs among grazing animals in many parts of the world, including livestock along the 'anthrax belt' in eastern Australia, which extends from Queensland to Victoria. Anthrax is considered a possible weapon of biological warfare, as the pulmonary form of the disease has a very high fatality rate and is difficult to treat.
In Sydney, the first publicised 'white powder' incident occurred at Kingsford Smith Airport on 14 October 2001, but earlier incidents had been reported to the police from 11 October. An attendant found an amount of white powder on a piece of luggage and alerted airport security staff. The material was soon found not to be B. anthracis. The discovery of suspicious powders that followed was abetted by a number of deliberate hoaxes.
The NSW Government opened the Police Operations Centre (POC) in Surry Hills to help deal with the threat of terrorist activity. This communication facility allowed the collation of information from all the relevant events and provided a venue for meetings between representatives of NSW Police, NSW Fire Brigades, the Ambulance Service of NSW, and NSW Health. NSW Health's responsibility was to provide appropriate prevention, treatment, and guidelines, should a genuine case of anthrax be identified. NSW Health was also to report laboratory results to affected people and to help abate the fear caused by the exposure. Given the low risk that this threat posed, the preventive use of antibiotics was not recommended by NSW Health.
METHOD

Reporting of incidents
People who were concerned that they had been exposed to suspicious powders generally sought help by calling emergency services on '000'. The emergency service response included attendance at the site, initial assessment of the risk, recording of personal details, collection of the suspect items, and the decontamination of affected people and surfaces. Three levels of exposure were recognised in the response: people who had touched a suspicious powder; people who had been close to a suspicious powder; and people who had been in the same room as a suspicious powder. The suspicious powders were transported to the NSW Police Forensics Services Group (FSG) laboratory where a sample was extracted for microbiological assay at the Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research (ICPMR) at Westmead Hospital.
Collection of forensic specimens
On receipt at the FSG laboratories, specimens were stored until they could be checked for the presence of irritant, toxic, or explosive chemicals or radioactive materials. Where such chemicals or materials were absent, a sample of any suspicious material was taken to ICPMR. FSG carried out full criminal investigations on any specimen that came from a deliberate hoax.
A system of assigning priority to samples was initiated in cooperation between NSW Health and NSW Police. This gave a high priority to samples from incidents in which a person had come into contact with the suspicious powder, a medium priority for incidents where the material was loose but had not been touched, and a low priority to incidents where a suspicious package had been received but not opened.
Microbiological testing
All samples were processed in a physical containment Level 3 (PC3) laboratory within the ICPMR. Gram and spore stains were performed directly on powder as a rapid presumptive test. Samples were inoculated on to a variety of media designed to detect the presence of other potential biohazard agents (such as Yersinia pestis) as well as B. anthracis. Plates were examined after 24 and 48 hours incubation. Gram positive, spore-forming rods that were non-motile and non-haemolytic, underwent further identification by PCR, cellular fatty acid analysis as well as standard biochemical tests to exclude B. anthracis. All results were sent to the POC via secure fax.
Public health follow up of potentially exposed persons Public health units (PHUs) responded to the first of these incidents on an ad hoc basis. This provided some models with which to adapt the existing NSW Health DISPLAN to the peculiarities of these events. Information about the activities of the emergency services was also gathered and a protocol for the uniform transfer of information was established.
Microbiological results were communicated to the POC where they were matched with the contact details of exposed people collected by the police. This information was collated by health liaison officers and sent to the relevant PHU for communication to the exposed person. An Access database to store the data about exposed people was developed during the response period. This database received information from the FSG, the emergency services incident reports, and the laboratory results.
The PHUs contacted people who had been exposed to the suspect materials to provide results of testing and to offer counselling or other mental health services. The PHUs provided summaries of the numbers of people contacted for each incident and how many had undergone prophylactic treatment or had accepted counselling.
Descriptive analyses were performed on the collected data using Microsoft Access and Excel software. We examined the temporal and spatial distributions of incidents, and the proportions of different responses. The analysis was limited to the study period 14 October to 16 November 2001.
RESULTS
Incidents
Between 11 October and 16 November, approximately 990 'white powder' incidents were reported by members of the public to emergency services. Police reported that 1,534 people had been potentially exposed to these substances both directly and by proximity. Samples from 535 incidents (54 per cent) were received for testing at the FSG laboratories and the following results are based on this group of events. These incidents were more frequently reported on a weekday, and during the weeks beginning 14 October and 21 October (Figure 1 ). Sydney and its suburbs was the source for 415 of these incidents (77 per cent). However, incidents were experienced in every area health service. Police estimated that about one third were hoaxes. The remainder were precautionary calls about powder in legitimate postal items or in unexpected places including tissue boxes and elevators.
Forensic samples and microbiological test results
Of the 535 samples, 151 (28 per cent) yielded no material suitable for microbiological assay, and 375 samples (70 per cent) had been through the full 48-hour culture period and the results reported to the POC. The remaining nine samples had either not been cleared by the FSG or had not been finally processed by ICPMR at the end of the study period. No positive result for Bacillus anthracis was identified. Among some of the substances submitted, further analysis identified talcum powder, cleaning agents, sugar, and starch. Anecdotal reports from emergency services personnel indicated that observations of powders at the site of incidents identified cement, dust from gyprock, and laundry detergent.
Public health
Of 1,534 exposed people, 853 (55.6 per cent) were reported to have been contacted by PHU staff. Of these, five (0.3 per cent) received prophylaxis from hospitals-which was not consistent with public health advice-and 31 (2.0 per cent) were referred for counselling to an area mental health service.
DISCUSSION
No incidents of exposure to anthrax-containing substances were identified in NSW, or elsewhere in Australia, during the study period. However, in the United States, postal delivery of B. anthracis spores led to the infection of 22 individuals, of whom five eventually died. 2 Anthrax scares occurred throughout Australia and the world during October and November 2001. Positive tests for B. anthracis from the post were announced from Kenya, the Bahamas, Greece, Brazil, Russia, India and Pakistan, all of which were retracted after further testing. The only confirmed positive result was an environmental sample found in Argentina. The spores were of the Sterne variety, used for making vaccines for animals, and were found in a letter.
The Health Services Disaster Control Centre (HSDCC) at Rozelle was opened from 22 October to coordinate the overall health response (ambulance, public health, mental health, hospital, and laboratory). NSW Health made use of existing plans for dealing with terrorist actions and events of biological warfare, as outlined in DISPLAN, to respond to the 'suspicious white powder' incidents. These plans had been developed or made more detailed in preparation for the 2000 Olympics; however, the 'suspicious white powder' incidents were smaller and more frequent than those planned for in DISPLAN. The investigation and follow-up of these incidents provided a huge challenge for NSW Health. Coordinating information from different sources, provided by multiple agencies, through incompatible information systems, was difficult. Although the liaison officers at the POC tried to keep PHUs informed about incidents in their areas as they occurred, this was not sustainable and the work shifted to concentrating on those incidents for which results were available.
During the process of checking for the presence of dangerous substances, 151 samples proved to have no material amenable to microbiological assay. According to comments from PHU staff, reporting this to exposed people required a particular sensitivity because some exposed people remained concerned in the absence of a definite identification of the material to which they had been exposed. Similarly, anecdotal reports suggest that exposure to 'suspicious white powders' caused substantial stress for some people. It would be valuable, in any future events of such an unusual nature, to establish an evaluative process to assess the mental health effects of public health responses to those events.
After the first three weeks of the response to the outbreak of anthrax scares in NSW, as it became clear that none of the exposures had involved a real threat, the NSW Health response was scaled down, to become less intensive. This reduced demand on staff, while maintaining a service to ensure the public's health. To facilitate this, the emergency services staff attending the incidents were provided with a detailed fact sheet, to give to exposed people, explaining the circumstances under which they would or would not be contacted with laboratory results.
In the absence of a positive result, the main concern of NSW Health was the reduction of anxiety among people who had been involved in incidents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the action of decontaminating people who were exposed to 'suspicious white powders', which was expected to reduce their anxiety, instead seemed to increase it. Similarly, it was suggested that reporting results had the potential to reawaken anxiety, especially when no tests had been conducted or when there had been a long wait for the results.
CONCLUSIONS
This outbreak demonstrated the ability of NSW Health to work cooperatively with other agencies, and reinforced the importance of regular dialogue between agencies. Regular consultation and reporting within NSW Health was important, since many different tasks were undertaken in isolation from each other and the individuals involved needed to know the requirements and constraints of those engaged in other tasks.
At the time, it seemed that placing health liaison officers in the police facilities was worthwhile, to facilitate communication between the different agencies and to ensure appropriate and effective responses. Critical to this was explaining the priorities of the different agencies to each other. However, this complicated the coordination of the NSW Health response, and was associated with increased stress among those staff. Instead, the collation
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Australian Defence Force, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, the NSW Police Forensic Services, the NSW Fire Brigade, and the NSW Department of Health.
These procedures were reactivated in mid-October 2001, following the report of a case of inhalational anthrax in the United States on 4 October and of laboratory confirmation of a second case on 12 October. These cases were the first in a bioterrorism-related outbreak of anthrax in the United States that eventually involved 22 cases and five deaths due to exposure to finely milled spores of Bacillus anthracis sent through the mail. 1 This outbreak led to widespread laboratory testing for environmental contamination in the United States, and a worldwide spate of hoaxes and perceived threats of bioterrorism involving possible exposure to suspicious 'white powders' and other suspicious substances.
2,3
METHODS
Organisation of the NSW response
The CIDMLS received the first specimens of suspicious substances for analysis on 12 October 2001. Procedures for the handling of suspicious substances, and identification of agents of bioterrorism (that is, the bacteria isolated from suspicious substances), established before the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000, were reactivated. A team of staff was formed to deal with large numbers of specimens as rapidly as possible.
Initially, the CIDMLS received a number of large objectssuch as mailbags, parcels, other potentially contaminated articles, and quantities of suspicious powders-in and coordination of information could probably have been conducted in the offices of NSW Health, from data provided directly from the Police Forensics Services Group and the laboratories of the ICPMR.
'hazardous material' (hazmat) containers, with a request to exclude the presence of infectious material prior to forensic examination. Procedures were developed to maintain integrity of evidence, in case of subsequent criminal prosecution. All samples submitted to the CIDMLS remained in the custody of the Police Forensic Services Group, which reported the results of laboratory testing; this relieved laboratory staff from constant telephone enquiries.
Within a few days, a NSW Police Operations Centre was opened to coordinate communication between all the agencies involved in the investigation and control of incidents, including the police, the fire brigade, and NSW Health. 'Hazardous material' teams were responsible for management of incident sites, and for collection and packaging of articles for testing using standard operating procedures. Each sample for laboratory investigation was given a unique 'event number' that allowed tracking, collation of results, and follow-up of people exposed in the incident. All laboratory results were sent to both the Police Operations Centre and Police Forensic Services Group via secure fax. Public health units were responsible for follow-up, for communicating results of laboratory testing, and for reassuring people potentially exposed to suspicious substances. This responsibility is described in an accompanying article by Leask, Delpech, and McAnulty in this issue of the NSW Public Health Bulletin. 4 Meanwhile, the national Public Health Laboratory Network (PHLN) established common laboratory procedures for the safe transport and handling of suspicious 'white powders'. 5 A workshop was held on 19 October 2001 at the Queensland Health Scientific Services Laboratory at Coopers Plains, Queensland, at which representatives of all PHLN laboratories shared methods of identification and analysis of B. anthracis, particularly nucleic acid detection using polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
Sample collection
Samples suspected of containing bacterial agents of bioterrorism must be examined in a physical containment level 3 (PC3) laboratory within the CIDMLS. To be handled safely, they must be free of radioactive and or toxic chemical agents and be received in a clean container small enough to be opened safely in a biological safety cabinet. This excludes large items, such as mailbags. After discussion with the Police Forensic Services Group and the NSW Fire Brigade, a staging area was established at the Police Forensic Services Group headquarters at Westmead, where articles were tested for radioactive substances and toxic chemicals, and where small samples of any suspicious substance were collected. Samples were packed in 'hazardous material' containers and transported to the PC3 laboratory in the same way as routine specimens, in accordance with Instruction Number 602 of the
International Air Transport Association Dangerous Goods Regulations.
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Microbiological testing
Protocols for the examination of 'white powders' or suspicious substances include phase contrast microscopy and examination of a gram stained preparation by light microscopy for bacteria and spores, which are the basis of a preliminary report. Initially, specimens were inoculated into media that support the growth of all known bacterial agents of bioterrorism. However, within the first week, intelligence reports established that the risk was confined to B. anthracis and laboratory protocols were modified accordingly. Brain heart infusion (BHI) broth and two blood agar plates were inoculated. BHI broth and one blood agar plate were incubated at 35 o C aerobically, and one blood agar plate was incubated in CO 2 . The plates were examined after 24 and 48 hours of incubation for the presence of non-haemolytic colonies of gram positive non-motile rods resembling B. anthracis.
Suspicious isolates were tested by B. anthracis-specific PCR, initially using the method modified by Queensland Health Scientific Services from a published method, 6 and later using an in-house fluorescence detection method with a faster 'turn around' time. Additional testing included bacterial fatty acid analysis by gas chromatography and standard biochemical tests.
7
RESULTS
Samples submitted and results of microbiological testing
In NSW, there were two main periods of activity: 15 October to 23 November 2001, following bioterrorismrelated outbreaks of anthrax in the United States; and 2 January to 6 February 2002, following an extortion threat on the McDonalds' food chain. More than 1,000 incidents were investigated during these periods. During the first period, the Bioterrorism Response Unit at the CIDMLS examined 475 samples; during the second period, 119 samples were examined. Spores were not identified by microscopy in any samples submitted. B. anthracis grows readily on blood agar plates incubated at 35 o C, and is usually detectable within 18-24 hours. A wide variety of bacteria were isolated from samples, mainly environmental, including many non-haemolytic colonies of gram positive rods (nine of which were nonmotile and closely resembled B. anthracis; however, specific PCR was negative and all nine suspicious isolates were subsequently identified as B. megaterium using a combination of gas chromatography and standard biochemical tests).
The total time for the PCR assay on suspicious colonies, after an average of 16-18 hours incubation (overnight), was four hours, which allowed a provisional result to be issued within 24 hours of receipt of the specimen in the laboratory.
DISCUSSION
Bacterial agents of bioterrorism are generally classified as risk category group three (RCG3) pathogens. Handling of powders or other material suspected to contain them should be performed in a PC3 facility. Weaponised agents of bioterrorism, including B. anthracis spores and Coxiella burneti (the cause of Q fever), are developed for aerosol delivery and can remain viable for many years. Safe investigation requires staff trained to handle dangerous organisms. It also requires well-documented procedures, not only for microbiological testing but also to ensure biological security and integrity of forensic evidence.
Previous bioterrorism response protocols for the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 were useful in managing the incidents between October 2001 and February 2002. In particular, existing procedures for a coordinated and practical decision-making that could be rapidly reactivated were invaluable. However, the 'white powder' incidents were a significant challenge to all agencies involved, including the CIDMLS. Previous procedures were designed for response to incidents of bioterrorism associated with defined events and venues. The possibility of agents of bioterrorism being disseminated through the postal system greatly increased the number of possible exposures, and the demand for resources needed to manage them.
The establishment of a staging area for screening, and pre-testing of suspicious articles, greatly facilitated handling of specimens and reduced the laboratory workload. Triage of specimens allowed some specimens that did not contain suspicious substances to be discarded. Multiple copies of specimens, such as advertising mail, that were suspected of being contaminated, were not tested once the presence of B. anthracis spores had been excluded in one sample.
Nevertheless, during the first six-week period, staff who normally perform routine diagnostic and public health microbiology were on call almost continuously so that samples could be processed as rapidly as possible. Accrued days off were cancelled and administrative and non-urgent maintenance procedures were postponed. The PC3 laboratory at the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology is normally used for diagnosis of tuberculosis and analysis of cultures thought to contain other RCG3 pathogens such as Brucella spp. Careful planning was required to ensure that the bioterrorism work did not interfere with routine work and, after the first two weeks, all but the most urgent samples were batched to make optimal use of the PC3 facility. Major public health laboratories in other jurisdictions experienced similar problems; however, because of the relatively large population of Sydney, the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology received more than half of all bioterroism-related specimens submitted to laboratories in Australia during this period. This heavy workload could not have been sustained without significantly compromising routine laboratory functions.
Even when the chance of detecting B. anthracis is low, rapid handling of specimens to exclude its presence as quickly as possible is essential to allow people potentially exposed to be reassured and normal business to resume in premises suspected of being contaminated. Rapid methods for on-site testing of samples for B. anthracis are still unreliable. At present, rapid PCR on suspicious overnight cultures provides the best balance of accuracy and speed, although further confirmatory testing is needed. 3, 4 with the majority of these cases likely to be acquired locally. Following the notification of cases of Ross River virus infection acquired from one locality in the Wentworth Area Health Service in 1999 and in 2000-01, a serological survey accompanied by a self-administered questionnaire was performed. This article describes the results of the survey and the questionnaire that were undertaken to determine the prevalence of undiagnosed cases and to investigate the prevalence of risk factors.
METHODS
The serological survey was designed to identify the prevalence of undiagnosed cases within the local area where cases had been previously notified. To accompany the survey, a questionnaire was designed to identify the symptoms and risk factors associated with any further cases notified.
The Werrington neighbourhood, within the Penrith Local Government Area, was chosen as it contained the residence of notified cases of Ross River virus infection. A list of households from an area of approximately three-square kilometres within Werrington was obtained, using an electronic telephone directory. Phone calls were made to every second household on the list, and additional phone calls were made where there was no response. Within the households contacted, all individuals over the age of 12 years were eligible to take part in the survey and invited to attend a clinic for a free blood test. A letter confirming the place and time of the clinic appointment was sent to participating households. Clinics were held twice-weekly at the local community centre over a three-week period during May 2001. At the clinic, each participant provided 10 ml of blood and completed a self-administered questionnaire on risk-avoidance behaviours and symptoms for Ross River virus infection, and for possible exposures to mosquitoes during the period January to May 2001.
Blood samples were tested for specific antibodies against Ross River virus at the Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research, Westmead using a neutralising Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) total antibody test. This test has a sensitivity of 99 per cent and a specificity of 100 per cent. 5 If the test was positive, specific IgM was measured using an IgM capture ELISA, a test that has a sensitivity of 98 per cent and a specificity of 99 per cent. 5 A case of Ross River virus infection was defined as a positive serological result, irrespective of symptoms. Where symptoms consistent with Ross River virus infection were reported, local acquisition was defined as not having travelled outside the Penrith Local Government Area during the incubation period (which is four weeks prior to onset of illness). Participants with positive results were contacted by telephone and a letter was sent to participants with negative results.
The data were entered into Microsoft Access and analysed using Excel and SAS software. Ethics approval was granted by the Wentworth Area Health Service Ethics Committee.
RESULTS
The contact details of 1,345 households were obtained. Of the 778 calls made, 444 (57 per cent) agreed to receive information on Ross River virus infection. Of the 444 households who agreed to receive information, 179 households agreed to participate in the survey. Of these 179 households, 325 residents agreed to attend the clinic, provide blood samples, and answer a self-administered questionnaire.
A comparison between the population of the survey area and the sample population tested for Ross River virus is shown in Table 1 . 6 The age structure of the sample population was significantly different compared to the study population (χ 2 =50.6, df=7, p<0.01) with the older age group (50-75 years of age) over-represented and the
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A SEROLOGICAL SURVEY younger age group (<25 years of age) under-represented in the sample population.
Of the 325 residents tested, five had recent exposure (IgG positive, IgM positive) and six had a previous exposure to Ross River virus (IgG positive, IgM negative). This produced a point prevalence of 1.5 per cent for recent exposure (95%CI=0. 5-3.6) . Of the five recently exposed cases, three were symptomatic and two were asymptomatic. Two of the symptomatic cases most likely acquired the infection locally as they reported that they had not travelled outside the area during the incubation period. None of the five recent Ross River virus infections had been previously diagnosed or notified to the Wentworth Population Health Unit.
The majority of participants who provided a blood sample did not to take precautions against Ross River virus infection ( Table 2 ). Behaviours were also compared between those aware of the risk of Ross River virus infection from mosquito bites (75.6 per cent of participants) and those unaware of the risk from mosquito bites (24.4 per cent of participants). Those aware of the risk were significantly more likely to remove mosquitobreeding sites than those unaware of the risk (Relative Risk 'RR'=2.5, 95%CI=1.3-5.0). Those aware of the risk were also more likely to use knockdown spray in their bedrooms than those unaware of the risk, although this difference was not significant ('RR'=1.9, 95%CI=0.9-3.7). For the remaining behaviours, there was no significant difference between those aware of the risk and those unaware of the risk.
DISCUSSION
This survey was undertaken in response to an apparent cluster of Ross River virus infection within the Werrington area. Of three serological surveys for Ross River virus since 1980, one survey in Queensland reported a 1.4-3.5 per cent infection rate, 7 while studies in New South Wales and South Australia found a recent infection rate of 1.7 per cent and 0 per cent respectively. 1, 8 The prevalence in our study (1.5 per cent) is consistent with these surveys.
Our study is not without limitations, the main one being that only one blood test was taken for each participant and thus seroconversion was not confirmed. Since IgM can persist in the body for some time, it is difficult to determine when infection occurred. 9 The recruitment process was not random; however, this was not considered to be a problem, as the selection of every second household provided a stratified sample that resulted in participants being drawn from all over the survey area. This method of recruiting individuals to the study was effective, as 325 people from 179 households volunteered to provide a blood sample. This was a reasonable response considering that initial contact was by telephone, and that participants gained little personal benefit from their involvement. Confirming the time and place of blood collection, and the use of the local neighbourhood centre, may have helped increase the response rate. Selection bias could occur, however, with the possibility that individuals with Ross River virus-like symptoms were more likely to agree to provide a blood sample than those without symptoms. Likewise, measurement bias may have occurred, as selfreport was used to record risk behaviours. If this measurement bias did occur, it is likely to have been nondifferential as many risk factors did not differ between those who were aware of the risk of Ross River virus infection and those who were not aware.
The results from the questionnaire of risk behaviours for Ross River virus infection show that the majority of 3 This article describes the evolution of a statewide approach to court diversion and court liaison in NSW and its context in the overall provision of forensic mental health services.
OVERVIEW OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH POLICY
A strategic approach to the delivery of forensic mental health services has been addressed in the draft NSW Forensic Mental Health Strategy. 4 The aim of the strategy is to provide an integrated comprehensive forensic mental health system in NSW and to propose a comprehensive model to support forensic mental health services. The Second National Mental Health Plan identifies the need for improved mental health services for this specific population. 5 Likewise, the discussion paper Towards a National Approach to Forensic Mental Health is a guide to the development of these improved services. 6 The discussion paper proposes a comprehensive and integrated statewide approach involving several state government departments providing tertiary specialist forensic mental health services (such as a forensic hospital clinic, a forensic community clinic, a court liaison service, and psychiatric services to prisons). This will work in collaboration with secondary services provided by the local area mental health services (such as general psychiatric hospitals, community mental health services, and private mental health practitioners).
A proposed model for the provision of integrated forensic mental health services in NSW is based on best practice models elsewhere in Australia, New Zealand, and other countries. 6 Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia have similar approaches to provision of an integrated statewide model of service delivery. A statewide forensic mental health approach should provide a range of specialist services to the existing local area mental health services across NSW. These specialist services include the following four components: inpatient services provided in secure forensic psychiatric facilities, community forensic mental health services, prison mental health services, and court diversion and court liaison services. These four components must work in unison, and should collaborate closely with existing local area mental health services, to provide effective pathways for comprehensive specialist forensic mental health services.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955, Rule 82 (1), states that: '… persons who are found to be insane shall not be detained in prisons and arrangements shall be made to remove them to mental institutions as soon as possible'. 7 In practice, such people have in the past spent extended periods in prison rather than in hospital. 8 The development of a new forensic mental health hospital, in an appropriately secure environment outside of prison, is an essential ingredient in the spectrum of services that forensic patients need. An external judiciary process, such as the courts or the NSW Mental Health Review Tribunal, would determine the security locations of mentally ill or mentally disordered defendants and offenders in the forensic system. The target group for forensic mental health services in NSW includes the formal definition 'forensic patient' as defined in Schedule 1 of the NSW Mental Health Act 1990: that is, people found not guilty by reason of mental illness, people unfit to stand trial, and inmates from the prisons who are usually temporarily transferred under Section 97 and 98 of that Act. 9 The forensic services may also include offenders or alleged offenders referred directly by the courts, particularly aggressive patients with high treatment needs, sex offenders, stalkers, and arsonists.
COURT DIVERSION AND COURT LIAISON
Court diversion and court liaison are not synonymous terms but they are closely related.
Court diversion
Court diversion has been defined as a transfer of mentally ill people from criminal justice system to hospital or community mental health placements. 10 It involves the access of mentally ill or mentally disordered defendants to mental health services. It does not equate to discontinuation of existing criminal charges, but it does allow the courts to be informed of relevant mental health issues as they relate to the defendant and the community. With this in mind, a formal diversionary measure was included within Sections 32 and 33 of the NSW Mental Health (Criminal Procedures) Act 1990. 11 These Sections only relate to summary (often minor) offences and not to committal proceedings or indictable offences.
MOVING TOWARDS A STATEWIDE APPROACH TO COURT DIVERSION SERVICES IN NSW
Court liaison
Court liaison has a broader meaning, which includes court diversion. It also includes the linking, brokering, and advocating for appropriate care; collaborating with the various agencies and departments in providing continuity of services; and a shared responsibility for the management and care of the forensic client that avoids duplication of tasks and roles by joint stakeholders. 12 Court liaison sits within a broader framework model for forensic patients and compliments, but does not replicate, the existing local area community mental health services in providing an integrated model of service provision.
NSW STATEWIDE COMMUNITY AND COURT LIAISON SERVICE
The operational task of the NSW Statewide Community and Court Liaison Service (SCCLS) begins when people with mental health problems or disorders are apprehended by the police. The police, corrective services, legal aid services, and magistrates, bring this specific population to the attention of the court-based SCCLS staff. To improve identification of our target population, we have engaged in educational initiatives and regular consultation with lawyers, custodial staff, and magistrates. Association and collaboration occurs not only in the courthouse but also in other arenas such as police cells, lawyers' offices, and correctional centres. The requirements of confidentiality and informed consent are met at all times.
Psychiatric assessment, and negotiation by our health staff involves liaison with families, mental health services, nongovernment agencies, public prosecutors, lawyers, magistrates, the NSW Department of Corrective Services, general practitioners, and private psychiatrists, among others. The SCCLS also links clients with the existing mental health services provided by Corrections Health within correctional centres. On discharge from prison, the SCCLS staff re-links inmates with mental health problems and mental disorders back to the local area mental health services.
ACCESS TO MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
The SCCLS also assists where appropriate with admissions to psychiatric inpatient facilities, 9 and advises custodial staff on medications and other health matters. People on orders under Section 32 of the NSW Mental Health (Criminal Procedures) Act 1990, 11 and people on bail, are linked with the local community mental health centres. 3 Although the SCCLS provides court liaison services, both in-custody and out-of-custody, it does not provide outpatient psychiatric treatment in the courthouse. Forensic psychiatric treatment is the combined role of an envisaged statewide community forensic service and the existing local area community mental health centres.
COURT REPORTS
In May 2002, the SCCLS became involved in quality initiatives of the Statewide Court Report Unit of the Clinical Services Directorate, Corrections Health Service. This court reporting program provides comprehensive consultant psychiatric reports for the courts for those individuals in custody housed at the 29 prisons across the state. The reporting service has been highly successful in reducing the report production time from 12 to two weeks. Where a more complex or detailed psychiatric assessment is needed for a person in custody, a forensic psychiatric report can be produced no-matter where the origin of the requesting court.
THE EFFECTIVENESS AND OUTCOMES OF COURT LIAISON SERVICES
The quality and efficiency of diversion schemes can be measured on a range of health and judiciary performance indicators. These may include quality of life and social wellbeing, rates of re-hospitalisation, rates of incarceration and recidivism, court processing time, and time spent on remand. 13 A key performance indicator is the ability to successfully negotiate diversion of mentally ill or disordered individuals away from the criminal justice system towards a variety of community and inpatient mental health facilities.
A range of factors may affect the ability of area mental health services to accept the mentally disordered offender. These may include demands on existing services, the perceived dangerousness of the mentally disordered offender, and a myth that prison mental health services are better equipped to manage mentally ill defendants with minor criminal charges. The latter factor is sometimes referred to as 'the criminalisation of the mentally ill', a factor that poses a particular challenge for staff involved with court liaison schemes.
14 Our court liaison mental health staff play an important role in advocating and facilitating access to community based mental health services as a viable alternative to incarceration for minor offences. 4 The judiciary, not mental health workers, determine the outcome of judicial proceedings. The longterm benefit from ongoing negotiations with area mental health services is improved access to psychiatric treatment and care for mentally disordered offenders at the interface of the criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
The forensic population is a small target group who are relatively under-serviced. This small target group usually requires specific resources and expertise to manage their often complex and serious problems. Court liaison should be seen as part of a spectrum of forensic mental health services that address the needs of this population.
FACTSHEET L E P T O S P I R O S I S WHAT IS LEPTOSPIROSIS?
Leptospirosis is a bacterial disease of humans and animals. It is caused by leptospira bacteria that are found in infected animal urine and animal tissues.
WHAT ARE THE SYMPTOMS?
Common initial symptoms of leptospirosis are fever, severe headache, sore muscles, chills, vomiting, and red eyes. These symptoms can mimic other diseases, such as influenza, and diagnosis is often difficult. Some people do not have all of these symptoms.
Some people with leptospirosis go on to develop severe disease. This can include Weil's disease, which is kidney failure, jaundice (yellow colouration of the skin which indicates liver disease), and haemorrhage into skin and mucous membranes. Meningitis (inflammation of the lining of the brain) and bleeding in the lungs can also occur. Most people who develop severe disease require hospitalisation and severe leptospirosis can sometimes be fatal.
WHAT ARE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS?
Recovery from leptospirosis infection can be slow. People can have a chronic-fatigue-like illness that lasts for months. Others can have persistent headache or depression.
Occasionally the bacteria can persist in the eyes and cause chronic eye inflammation.
HOW IS IT TRANSMITTED?
Leptospira bacteria usually enter the body through skin cuts or abrasions, and occasionally through the lining of the mouth, nose, and eyes. Many different animals can harbour leptospira bacteria in their kidneys. Transmission can occur after contact with infected animal urine or flesh. Soil, mud, or water that has been contaminated with animal urine can be the source of infection. Eating contaminated food or drinking contaminated water has occasionally been responsible for transmission.
WHAT ANIMALS ARE COMMONLY AFFECTED?
Many different mammals can carry leptospira bacteria. In Australia, these are most commonly rats and mice, dogs, cattle, native animals, pigs (both domestic and feral), horses, cats, and sheep. Infected animals may have symptoms of the disease or may be completely well.
WHO IS AT RISK?
People at risk are those who have close contact with animals or who are exposed to water, mud, soil, or vegetation that has been contaminated with animal urine.
Some occupations are at higher risk (for example: farmers, vets, abattoir workers, and sugar cane and banana farmers). Some recreational activities that involve contact with contaminated water or soil can also allow leptospirosis to be transmitted (for example: camping, gardening, bushwalking, white water rafting, and other water sports).
Although leptospirosis is relatively rare in Australia, it is more common in warm and moist regions such as northeastern NSW and Queensland. About 200 cases are diagnosed nationally each year, although there are likely to be many more undiagnosed cases. Men are affected more often than women.
HOW IS IT DIAGNOSED?
A doctor may suspect leptospirosis in someone who develops symptoms usually one to two weeks after exposure. Confirmation of leptospirosis is usually by a blood test that shows exposure to leptospira bacteria. In general, two blood tests taken more than two weeks apart are required to make the diagnosis. Occasionally, the bacteria can be grown from blood, cerebrospinal fluid, and urine.
IS THERE A TREATMENT?
Leptospirosis is commonly treated with antibiotics such as doxycycline or penicillin. Because the testing can take some time and the disease can be severe, a doctor may choose to start antibiotics prior to confirming the diagnosis with tests. Antibiotic treatment is thought to be most effective if started early in the disease.
HOW CAN LEPTOSPIROSIS BE PREVENTED?
There are a number of ways to prevent leptospirosis.
For people who work with animals:
• Cover cuts and abrasions with a waterproof dressing;
• Wear protective clothing (for example, gloves, eye shields or goggles, aprons and boots) when working with animals that could be infected, especially if there is a chance of contact with urine;
• Wear gloves when handling cattle placentas or stillborn or aborted calves or carcasses;
• Shower after work and wash and dry hands after handling potentially infected material;
• Do not eat or smoke while handling animals that may be infected. Wash and dry hands before smoking or eating;
• Vaccinate livestock as recommended by your vet.
For other people:
• Avoid swimming in water where there is a possibility of contamination with animal urine.
• Cover cuts and abrasions with waterproof dressings, especially before coming into contact with soil, mud or water that may be contaminated with animal urine.
• Wear footwear outdoors, especially when walking in mud or moist soil.
• Wear gloves when gardening.
• Control rodents by cleaning up rubbish and removing food sources that are close to housing.
• Do not feed raw offal to dogs.
• Wash hands with soap, as leptospira bacteria are quickly killed by soap, disinfectants, and drying.
WHAT DO I DO IF I BECOME SICK?
If you become sick in the weeks following possible exposure to animal urine or a contaminated environment, it is important to tell your doctor about the exposure.
IS THERE A VACCINE?
There is no human vaccine against leptospirosis licensed for use in Australia. Vaccines are available to prevent leptospirosis in animals (cattle, pigs and dogs) but vaccinated animals are still susceptible to other strains of the organism that are not covered by the vaccine.
CAN SOMEONE BE INFECTED MORE THAN ONCE?
Because there are many different strains of leptospira bacteria, it is possible for someone to be infected with another strain and develop leptospirosis again.
ARE PEOPLE WITH LEPTOSPIROSIS INFECTIOUS TO OTHER PEOPLE?
Rarely, leptospirosis can be transmitted from person-toperson (for example, through sexual transmission, and transmission in breast milk). The leptospira bacteria can be transmitted in urine for months following infection.
For more information contact your doctor, local public health unit, or community health centre: See under NSW Government at the front of the White Pages.
November-December 2003.
TRENDS
Notifications of communicable diseases through to
August 2003 show a typical pattern for late winter, with peaks in influenza, invasive pneumococcal disease, and meningococcal disease, and low levels of arbovirus infections, cryptosporidiosis and salmonellosis. In September, notifications of invasive pneumococcal disease began to decline (Figure 1 , Tables 4 and 5 ).
Across NSW, there was a modest increase in pertussis in August when 295 cases were notified, and in September when 306 cases were notified. Epidemics occur in NSW every 3 or 4 years, and it is possible that case numbers will continue to rise through the coming months. Clinicians are urged to consider pertussis as a diagnosis in people of any age presenting with a prolonged coughing illness, especially if coughing occurs in paroxysms (bouts), or if coughing paroxysms are followed by vomiting or an inspiratory whoop. Diagnosis may be assisted by nasopharyngeal swabs for PCR or culture (most usefully early in the course of the disease); or, in patients older than two years of age, IgA serology. Treatment with eryrthromycin is important, because it reduces the patient's infectiousness (from about three weeks to about five days), and so helps to protect those in close contact with the patient from contracting the disease. Unless given soon after symptoms begin, however, antibiotic treatment may have little effect on the course of the illness. Suspected cases should be reported by doctors, hospitals, and laboratories to the local public health unit. Infectious cases should stay at home and be excluded from school, childcare, or work. Close contacts may benefit from prophylactic treatment with erythromycin; the staff of public health units can advise on the management of cases and their contacts. Clinicians are also urged to ensure that all children are up to date with their immunisations. Adult pertussis vaccination is also available, and should be strongly considered for adults who regularly come into contact with small children (for example: new parents or grandparents, child care workers, and paediatric health care workers).
ENTERIC DISEASE August
Gastroenteritis in institutions continues to be commonly reported in the winter months. In August, five outbreaks involving more than 60 people were identified. The Hunter Public Health Unit reported two outbreaks, in a nursing home and a hospital. South Eastern Sydney, Western Sydney and Northern Sydney Public Health Units all reported outbreaks in nursing homes.
The Hunter Public Health Unit investigated a small outbreak involving four patrons who were ill after eating
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a restaurant meal. All worked at a local childcare centre but there appeared to be no other meals that they had in common, which could explain their illness.
The Northern Sydney Public Health Unit is investigating an outbreak of over 20 people who report illness after eating at a restaurant. Salmonella Typhimirium 170 was isolated from the stools of nine cases. The restaurant was inspected by public health unit staff and samples were tested for Salmonella. The cases and a selection of non-ill patrons were interviewed for possible common exposures. In a case control study, illness was significantly associated with eating a dish with fried tofu, prawn and eggplant. Sampling of raw prawn meat from the restaurant identified Salmonella Dublin, resulting in a national trade level recall of the imported product. Raw prawns may contain bacterial or viral pathogens. Thorough cooking is recommended to reduce the risk of illness from this food.
September
September was characterised by a large number of outbreaks reported in institutional settings, particularly aged care facilities.
There were eight outbreaks in nursing homes in Sydney involving over 160 people. Childcare centres accounted for 80 cases of gastroenteritis in five centres in Sydney.
There was one outbreak of gastroenteritis of unknown aetiology in a hospital ward.
Two residential colleges reported outbreaks. One, affecting 35 people, was suspected to be caused by Norovirus. In the other, Salmonella Typhimirium 135 was isolated from the stools of 13 residents.
Viral gastroenteritis can be prevented by thorough hand washing before eating and preparing food, and after using the toilet. People who are unwell with vomiting or diarrhoea are advised to stay at home and avoid work or school for 48 hours following the resolution of symptoms. Public health units are able to provide specific advice on the control of gastroenteritis in institutions. Table 1 diagnosed with AIDS in NSW, and 10 people ever diagnosed with AIDS were reported to have died. Table 2 details the percentage of fully immunised children aged 12 months to less than 15 months in each area health service, reported by all service providers.
QUARTERLY REPORT: HIV NOTIFICATIONS TO THE END OF JUNE 2003
QUARTERLY REPORT: AUSTRALIAN CHILDHOOD IMMUNISATION REGISTER
These data refer to five different cohorts of children whose age has been calculated 90 days before data extraction. The information contained in each of the reports has been extracted from the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) and may not reflect actual coverage due to under-reporting. These following two cases highlight the confusion that sometimes surrounds the management of varicella infections. Because of their increased risk of complications, varicella vaccination is especially recommended for non-immune adults.
Case 1
Case 1 is a healthy woman who was in the third trimester of her pregnancy when she contacted her public health unit to enquire about her risk of chickenpox, following the diagnosis of shingles in a close contact two weeks earlier. The woman reported no history of previous varicella infection. Serology was taken for varicella IgG and was negative. Because two weeks had elapsed since her first exposure, VZIG would be unlikely to be useful in prevention and the public health unit advised her to watch for, and to report, any symptoms of chickenpox in herself and in any other close contacts.
Almost two weeks later, Case 1 contacted the public health unit to report that another close contact had developed chickenpox vesicles the day before. The public health unit administered VZIG to Case 1, even though more than 96 hours may have passed since her first exposure to the second infectious close contact. A repeat varicella IgG serology, to explore the possibility of sub-clinical infection from exposure to the first close contact remained negative.
However, two weeks later, Case 1 developed chickenpox. The public health unit recommended she take oral acyclovir. The woman delivered her baby the next day, and VZIG was administered to the child at birth. Case 1 recovered uneventfully, and the neonate did not develop clinical chickenpox.
Case 2
Case 2 is a healthy woman who was in the second trimester of her pregnancy when a close contact developed chickenpox, diagnosed by her general practitioner. Case 2 had no history of chickenpox and tested varicella IgG negative.
Two weeks later, Case 2 presented to the general practitioner with vesicles and fever, and was diagnosed with chickenpox. She was prescribed paracetamol for fever. The next day she re-presented to the general practitioner with shortness of breath, vomiting, sore throat, and high temperature. She was diagnosed with varicella pneumonitis, admitted to hospital for intensive care, and treated with intravenous acyclovir. She subsequently recovered and the pregnancy continued. 
